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Analyses of ‘political conditionality’ since the early 1990s
have focused heavily on identifying trends in its application
and answering one central question – ‘does it work’? A less
common, but no less important, question, however, is ‘do pol-
icy-makers expect it to work?’ and, indeed, why do they use
the instrument? The apparent return of political conditionality
(PC) since the mid-2000s – particularly linked to the disburse-
ment of General Budget Support (GBS) – provides a suitable
opportunity to re-focus discussion of this phenomenon in a
manner that addresses this analytical and empirical gap.
This article will therefore attempt to explore donor motiva-
tions for imposing PC. In doing so, two major categories of
motivations for applying PC will be delineated. Developed
from conceptual debates in the literature on economic sanc-
tions these are: instrumental (where PC is applied to force
aid recipients to implement political reforms) and expressive
(where PC is applied to signal disapproval of the recipient’s
actions – for domestic or international audiences – without
the expectation that actual reforms will follow). Establishing
whether a particular PC decision is based primarily on instru-
mental or expressive rationales has important implications for
assessing the eﬀectiveness of the instrument; if donors do not
intend for a particular suspension to result in political change,
should they be criticized when it does not? Moreover, how
should scholars and practitioners view and approach the
instrument within this dispensation?
In investigating the key rationales for PC decisions the
policies and perspectives of one major donor – the United
Kingdom (UK) – will be reviewed and critiqued. Though sin-
gle-case-based analyses rarely provide a solid foundation for
developing comprehensive general theories on issues, they nev-
ertheless allow for a deep and nuanced consideration of a phe-
nomenon – and how it has changed over time. Since this article
aims at ﬁlling both a theoretical and empirical gap in the PC
literature a single-case study therefore represents a more
appealing option. Many ﬁndings associated with the British
case also, naturally, have parallels elsewhere in the interna-
tional aid system and some of these will be highlighted in
the conclusion.13A further set of reasons for focusing on the UK relate to
Britain’s particularly prominent role in promoting and
employing PC in the past (particularly between c.1991–95)
and in its revival since c.2004. Britain’s Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID) has also – more than many
other donors – consciously sought to explain and rationalize
its usage of PC since 2005 with a view to inﬂuencing how other
Western donors employ it, sometimes explicitly (Benn, 2005).
This has been a reasonable ambition given the widespread
acceptance among many in the Western development commu-
nity today that DFID represents a ‘thought leader’ second
only to the World Bank. 1 The UK’s position as one of the
leading aid donors – particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa –
and providers of GBS also provide it with a degree of inﬂuence
in international development fora and within ‘in-country’
cross-donor groupings that few other donors possess.
The article ultimately argues that while expressive motiva-
tions have always played a role in the UK’s PC decisions, they
have become increasingly central since the mid-2000s. Like-
wise, where the expressive dimensions of PC impositions in
the 1990s were mainly aimed at the international level, those
of today are focused far more clearly on domestic, British
audiences. Finally, while instrumental rationales were highly
14 WORLD DEVELOPMENTinﬂuential in the PC decisions of the 1990s they have become
largely irrelevant in the contemporary era. DFID oﬃcials do
not believe that PC can force political change on aid recipients
but continue to use it as a means of communicating with an
increasingly aid-skeptical domestic audience. The ﬁnal part
of the article will suggest a range of factors which have led
to this state of aﬀairs and explore the implications of these
ﬁndings for scholars and practitioners.
This analysis draws upon a range of semi-structured inter-
views carried out with current and former DFID staﬀ – and
former staﬀ of DFID’s predecessor, the Overseas Develop-
ment Administration (ODA) – during 2007–13. Interviewees
included current and former staﬀ at varying levels based in
both London/East Kilbride (henceforth ‘HQ’) 2 and regional
and country oﬃces. Internal DFID and ODA documents
released to the author under the 2000 UK Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOI) are also analyzed together with public state-
ments, ODA/DFID documents, and media reporting. The
author also held an Honorary Research Fellowship in the For-
eign and Commonwealth Oﬃce (FCO) during 2013–14. While
no information or data collected during this Fellowship has
been directly cited in this article the experience has neverthe-
less informed its analysis.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews and
critiques the existing literature on PC, highlighting in particu-
lar its reluctance to explore the intentions and perspectives of
donor oﬃcials involved in imposing the modality. The litera-
ture on the purpose of economic sanctions, however, does
speak to this debate – albeit indirectly – and is therefore
engaged with as a means to develop a set of categories for con-
ceptualizing donor PC rationales. Section 3 introduces the
British case and analyzes the UK’s employment of PC since
the Cold War highlighting a signiﬁcant shift in UK thinking
on the modality’s eﬃcacy from instrumental to expressive.
Section 4 delineates a number of reasons for this shift in the
last decade linked to the domestic and international political
economy of aid management in the contemporary era before
returning to the question posed in the title of this piece – does
[expressive PC] “work”? The article concludes by exploring the
implications of these ﬁndings for development scholars and
policy-makers more broadly.2. POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY UNDER SCRUTINY
The term ‘political conditionality’ (PC) has been deﬁned and
employed in several diﬀerent ways by scholars and policy-
makers since its coining in the early 1990s. In essence, it refers
to the placing by donors of ‘political’ conditions upon their aid
disbursements with many scholars dividing this behavior into
‘positive’ conditionality (where aid is released once conditions
have been fulﬁlled) and ‘negative’ or ‘restrictive’ conditionality
or ‘aid sanctions’ (where aid is suspended when conditions
have not been, or are no longer being, fulﬁlled) (Crawford,
1997, pp. 69–70; Stokke, 1995, pp. 11–13; Waller, 1995, pp.
401–408). Much of the PC literature has, however, tended to
focus upon the latter – as this study will also do. In so doing,
the emphasis will be on exploring the reasons why ‘negative’
PC (subsequently simply PC) has been imposed rather than
why it has also, sometimes, not.
Within this literature, however, there have been few
attempts to clearly outline what makes a condition ‘political’
as opposed to purely ‘economic’ (a version of conditionality
contrasted with PC by many commentators). While aid
suspensions relating to democratization and civil and political
liberties have invariably been included in PC analyses (Brown,2005; Crawford, 1997, 2000; Stokke, 1995), those linked to
high-level corruption and economic mismanagement have
been less systematically incorporated. This division is some-
what artiﬁcial, however, since donors have frequently sus-
pended aid based on ‘governance concerns’ which – when
unpacked – clearly refer to interlinked democratization and
corruption-related issues (De Felice, 2013). This article will
therefore understand ‘PC’ to refer to aid suspensions linked
to governance-related matters, broadly deﬁned to include cor-
ruption as well as democratic backsliding, human rights
abuses and fomenting regional insecurity. 3
Though isolated instances of PC being applied in the Cold
War era can be found (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997, pp.
27–30), the instrument has become a common feature of the
aid landscape only since c.1990–91. Never entirely abandoned,
its usage decreased signiﬁcantly by the mid-1990s only to be
revived – linked particularly to disbursements of GBS – in
the mid-2000s (Hayman, 2011; Molenaers, 2012; Molenaers,
Cepinskas, & Jacobs, 2010). Scholarly interest in PC has
tended to follow the interest of donors themselves with a sub-
stantial array of studies produced during c.1990–97 and –
again, linked to GBS – since c.2008. Though much of the latter
body of literature has, of course, built upon the former, the two
‘generations’ can be distinguished to some extent. Early 1990s
scholarship, for example, focused more on normative debates
surrounding PC (‘should it be used?’) than that of today
(Adam, Chambas, Guillaumont, Guillaumont Jeanneney, &
Gunning, 2004, pp. 1059–1060; Barya, 1993). Likewise, con-
temporary PC scholarship has generally focused more on
European donor behavior than that of other aid providers,
particularly the United States owing to the absence of GBS
in Washington’s range of aid modalities (Hayman, 2011;
Molenaers, 2012; Molenaers et al., 2010).
The two generations of PC commentary, however, share at
least one common feature. Both focus substantially on ques-
tions of PC’s ultimate instrumentality and eﬀectiveness; ‘does
it work? That is, does the threat of, or actual withholding [of
aid] sway recipient governments into a diﬀerent course of
action?’ (Hayman, 2011, p. 683; see also Crawford, 1997,
2000; Levitsky and Way, 2006; Molenaers et al., 2010;
Moore and Robinson, 1994; Smith, 1998; Stokke, 1995;
Uvin, 1993). Exploring whether PC ‘works’, however, fails
to investigate the extent to which donors themselves actually
apply it in the hope – or belief – that it will work, whatever
‘work’ is understood to mean. Likewise, interpreting donor
motivations for using PC only in terms of a rational state actor
weighing-up its balance of interests overlooks other more arbi-
trary, short-term, or mundane inﬂuences on the application of
PC including organizational factors, personalities of policy-
makers, and domestic political pressures (Lancaster, 2007;
Lindblom, 1959; Natsios, 2010).
The purpose of this article is not to reject these approaches
to understanding PC but, rather to oﬀer an alternative per-
spective – one which focuses on exploring and comprehending
the motivations of oﬃcials within donor agencies for actually
applying the instrument (Molenaers, 2012). For while develop-
ment practitioners often privately acknowledge that this think-
ing has changed in recent decades, this has not yet been
explored or established in scholarly literature. An exception
to this generalization can be found in the work of Collier
et al. where ﬁve donor objectives for imposing conditionality
are delineated. These span from incentivizing recipients to
undertake reforms to ‘signaling’ to ‘private agents’ that the
donor perceives a recipient country’s policy and economic
environment to be safe or unsafe for private investment
(Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont, & Gunning, 1997, pp.
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lighting of the broader functions of conditionality. Its value
for this study is somewhat limited, however, by its framing
of conditionality decisions rather narrowly in terms of princi-
pal–agent theory; inﬂuences, concerns, and drivers outside the
donor–recipient relationship are largely not considered in this
setup.
Salient questions on motivations have, nevertheless, been
addressed within the literature on economic sanctions. As long
ago as 1967, Galtung argued – in a study of economic sanc-
tions applied to Rhodesia – that sanctions can have ‘expressive
functions’ as well as ‘instrumental’ ones and that ‘there is the
value [on the part of an interested state] of at least doing some-
thing. . .of being busy in time of crisis’ – that is, in imposing
sanctions to make a political statement and not just to force
reform (Galtung, 1967, p. 411). Several scholars have since
sought to develop this instrumental/expressive distinction at
the conceptual level. Barber, for example, argues that there
are three levels of ‘objectives of sanctions’: primary (aimed
at prompting change in the ‘target state’), secondary (aimed
at persuading domestic and international audiences that the
sanctioning state is willing to act or deﬂecting criticism of inac-
tion), and tertiary (aimed at promoting a particular interna-
tional norm; Barber, 1979). Likewise, Lindsay delineates ﬁve
‘aims’ of imposing trade sanctions – compliance (by the target
with a stated policy), subversion (forcing the overthrow of the
target government), deterrence (discouraging the target from
repeating an action), international symbolism (similar to Bar-
ber’s tertiary objective), and domestic symbolism (similar to
Barber’s secondary objective; Lindsay, 1986).
These scholars all, of course, acknowledge that no decision
to impose sanctions is taken with only one objective or aim in
mind; the same is true of a PC or any other policy decision.
Their distinction between sets of motivations – particularly
that between instrumental (Barber’s primary objective and
Lindsay’s compliance, subversion, and possibly deterrence)
and expressive (Barber’s secondary and tertiary objectives
and Lindsay’s international and domestic symbolism) – can
nevertheless be helpfully applied to analyses of PC decisions,
which might be considered ‘aid sanctions’. The intellectual
and practical merits of focusing on this question of purpose
are also articulated clearly in the economic sanctions litera-
ture. As Portela notes, acknowledging the ‘multiplicity of
goals of sanctions’ also means acknowledging ‘that diﬀerent
goals should be measured separately’ (Portela, 2010, p. 11).
Understanding why donors impose PC is not just useful for
comprehending the phenomenon itself, therefore, it is also
important for establishing a meaningful set of indicators of
the instrument’s eﬀectiveness.
In applying this framework to PC motivations it is useful to
consider the extent to which Lindsay’s variety of aims actually
applies in reality. Thus, instrumental-based aid cuts are usu-
ally premised on compliance and deterrence but rarely, at least
explicitly, on subversion. The case of Malawi in 1992, how-
ever, reveals that PC impositions can – in part – lead to subver-
sion even if this was not part of the original rationale for the
aid suspension. The imposition of PC by most donors in that
year, for example, forced the aid-dependent Hastings Banda
government to hold a referendum on abolishing Malawi’s
one-party state – a poll it lost heralding multi-party electionsInstrumental
Subversion Compliance Deterrence
Figure 1. PC primary motivation spectrum.in 1994 which saw the autocratic Banda lose oﬃce (Brown,
2004). Likewise, expressive-based cuts can rarely be said to
have only domestic symbolism in mind and many such impo-
sitions clearly seek to make a point to domestic and interna-
tional audiences simultaneously.
Moreover, contextual factors must also be taken into
account to gain a fuller understanding of the background to
individual PC impositions. This includes the state of relations
between the donor and recipient, the latter’s perceived ‘value’
to the former in a range of areas (most notably security and
trade) as well as social and cultural ties between the two. It
also, however, includes a range of inﬂuences on the donor side
including the role of individual personalities and oﬃce-holders
in the decision-making process, the relative inﬂuence of gov-
ernment departments – and other donors – on aid policy
and the perceived proﬁle of a particular aid ‘crisis’ in the
domestic sphere in the minds of these actors.
The purpose of this article, nonetheless, is to focus on one
dimension of this context: whether or not the UK’s motiva-
tions when applying PC since the Cold War, have been based
primarily on instrumental rationales or on expressive ones.
This is not to say that decisions have not been premised on
a large range of rationales but rather that this study is inter-
ested in identifying the purpose through this particular lens.
To avoid stark and unrealistic dichotomies between the two
in this regard, it is perhaps best to see each PC decision as
being plotted somewhere on a spectrum between the two
extremes. At one end, the key focus is on the recipient state
while at the other the focus is on domestic audiences and man-
aging their perceptions of the donor. Such a spectrum might
look like this (see Figure 1).
Ascertaining the motivation behind PC decisions is, none-
theless, a methodologically challenging task. In part this is
because of the scarcity of quality and comparative data on
decisions – particularly those in the more distant past. More
generally, the separation of DFID from the FCO in 1997
and the gradual devolution of authority to regional and coun-
try oﬃces since this time render it even more complicated to
pinpoint the locus of decision-making in certain cases. While
senior ministers have largely retained the lead voice over PC
decisions since the Cold War (see below), the relative inﬂuence
of other Whitehall departments and ‘in-country’ staﬀ in this
regard has ﬂuctuated. Likewise, while DFID HQ has pub-
lished clear guidelines on PC since the mid-2000s these docu-
ments cannot necessarily be read as the de facto perspectives
of all DFID staﬀ.
In addressing these challenges, the strategy taken in this
research has been to focus ﬁrst on gathering data through
interviews. This material has then been triangulated with (in
order of preference) internal ODA, FCO, and DFID docu-
ments released to the author under the 2000 FOI Act, public
statements by ODA and DFID oﬃcials and publicly available
ODA and DFID documentation. In recognition of the above
challenges, interviewees have been sought from both head-
quarters (including those in ministerial oﬃces and a number
of directorates and divisions) and regional/country oﬃce level
as well as from counterparts in the FCO at equivalent levels
for the entire period under study. The same is true of internal
ODA, FCO, and DFID material accessed through FOI
requests.Expressive
International symbolism Domestic symbolism 
Sources: Adapted from Lindsay (1986).
16 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThis triangulation of data allows for the drawing of general
conclusions on the changing motivations behind UK PC deci-
sions since the Cold War. Greater detail is available, though,
on a number of cases throughout this period and these will
be explored in more depth in the subsequent analysis. These
include decisions on Kenya (1991), Malawi (1992), Uganda
(2006, 2010, 2011), Malawi (2011), and Rwanda (2013). Back-
ground information on interviewees is provided where possible
– though it is important to note that interviews were carried
out anonymously and often candid perspectives were
expressed on the understanding that identities would not be
disclosed; the location of interviews is also not disclosed as this
may compromise anonymity, particularly in the case of CO
staﬀ.
It is ﬁrst necessary, however, to introduce the UK case and
clarify how the management of PC by London has changed
institutionally since the end of theColdWar. It is also important
to delineate the ‘universe’ of UK PC cases during this period.3. THE UK’S USE OF POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY
SINCE THE COLD WAR: CHANGES AND
CONTINUITIES
(a) From ODA to DFID: eﬀects on PC policy
During the 1979–97 Conservative government, Britain’s aid
program was managed by the ODA – a semi-autonomous
organization within the FCO. ODA had its own minister of
state (Lynda – later Baroness – Chalker during 1989–97)
although was represented in Cabinet by this minister’s imme-
diate superior, the Foreign Secretary. During this period, Brit-
ish aid policy was frequently designed to support and defend
UK foreign policy interests, particularly those linked to trade
(Killick, 2005, pp. 68–83). Following the election of a Labor
administration in May 1997, however, ODA was separated
from the FCO becoming an independent department of state
– DFID – with its own secretary of state (Clare Short during
1997–2003) attending as a full member of Cabinet.
DFID rapidly established itself, strongly supported by
Short’s forceful dynamism, as the antithesis of its predecessor
(Vereker, 2002, pp. 136–138). 4 The Department deﬁned its
sole objective as being the ‘elimination of global poverty’ with
the linking of British aid programs to other objectives not only
discouraged but eﬀectively criminalized in the 2002 Interna-
tional Development Act. 5 The reluctance of many DFID oﬃ-
cials from Short downward to maintain a comprehensive
dialog with FCO colleagues over DFID policy in developing
states led to longstanding tension between the two depart-
ments, not least because DFID’s large budget (consistently
and signiﬁcantly higher than the FCO’s since 1997) made it
the de facto lead representative of the British government in
many capitals (Porteous, 2005, pp. 281–284). 6 Though the
DFID–FCO relationship has improved considerably in the
last decade, DFID oﬃcials continue to guard their budgets
against FCO attempts to inﬂuence spending decisions.
As well as seeking to change the intellectual culture of the
Department since 1997 through the hiring of staﬀ with closer
links to development (see below), DFID managers have also
attempted to decentralize development policy-making since
1997. 7 Thus ODA’s ‘regional oﬃce’ model was phased-out
in the early 2000s and replaced with the establishment of
DFID Country Oﬃces (COs) in almost every state receiving
UK aid. Staﬀ in COs are the key decision-makers on how
aid money is allocated in ‘their’ countries and this has not
changed since the election of a conservative-leaning coalitiongovernment in the UK in May 2010. 8 Indeed, the Conserva-
tive-Liberal Democrat Coalition has not only protected
DFID’s independence – to the chagrin of some Conservative
Party grandees – but has also ‘ring-fenced’ its budget in spite
of substantial cuts to government spending linked to the Glo-
bal Financial Crisis of 2007–08 (Guardian, October 20, 2010).
An important complication within this decentralization of
authority, however, concerns the imposition of PC, a decision
which has remained in the hands of DFID’s secretary of state
and his or her senior staﬀ (composed of senior civil servants,
private oﬃce staﬀ, and politically-appointed ‘Special Advisers’
(de Renzio et al., 2005, p. 30)). 9 Indeed, the dominance of PC
decision-making by ministers represents an important consis-
tency in the UK’s employment of the instrument since 1991
– although prior to 1997 it was the foreign secretary in consul-
tation with their junior minister, who was the primary actor in
this ﬁeld. Since the later 1990s, however, country oﬃces (COs)
have become increasingly signiﬁcant in the earlier part of this
process with assessments of crises and deteriorations in the aid
relationship being ordinarily identiﬁed at this level before
being referred to HQ for consideration and possible action.
DFID oﬃcials close to the latter end of this process neverthe-
less acknowledge that sometimes the impetus for such discus-
sions has come from the secretary of state. 10
Indeed, while PC decisions in the UK have long been taken
by ministers the progression from identiﬁcation of a ‘problem’
through to aid cut has rarely followed a linear pattern from
CO to minister’s oﬃce. Instead, PC decisions are best seen
as evolving from a set of discussions within and between three
core groups, all with slightly diﬀerent interests and perspec-
tives: 11
(a) The CO: the DFID team closest to the crisis and most
familiar with the context. Often events interpreted as
‘crises’ in London are viewed as part of a more gradual
deterioration in ‘direction of travel’ by these oﬃcials
and this, together with their often close day-to-day
working relationships with partner government oﬃ-
cials, can lead COs to discourage London from ‘press-
ing the nuclear button’ and suspending an entire aid
portfolio over one particular transgression.
(b) Regional Directors (and relevant department heads):
UK-based line managers of CO teams across particular
regions or specialities who must collate information on
particular crises and put together lists of ‘options’ for
ministers to take which balance DFID’s longer term
programmatic and strategic objectives with short-term
political and reputational concerns.
(c) Ministers and their oﬃces: the ﬁnal decision-making
team which includes those personally loyal to the min-
ister and mindful of his/her future career prospects as
well as senior civil servants. As well as considering their
Departments’ advice, ministers must also often take
into account counsel from other ministries (most nota-
bly the FCO, Ministry of Defence and Department of
Business or Trade, their party’s political interests and,
indeed, their own personal political ambitions.
The positions and decisions of other donors may also enter
into consideration at each of these levels to varying degrees.
This article will continue to refer to PC decisions of the
‘UK’, therefore, while acknowledging that the locus of deci-
sion-making on British aid suspensions has not been wholly
static since the end of the Cold War. Distinctions between
these groups, where relevant, will nevertheless be highlighted
where necessary and will be emphasized particularly in the
ﬁnal section of this piece where the eﬀectiveness of expressive
PC will be considered.
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Though the UK had imposed what might be called PC in a
number of isolated cases during the height of the Cold War,
those applied to Fiji in 1987, Burma in 1988, and – particularly
– Kenya in 1991 represent the ﬁrst examples of a more system-
atic and enduring policy shift. Since 1987, the UK has sus-
pended, delayed, or re-directed aid away from recipient
governments based on governance concerns in around 31
instances (see below) with the withholding of £9 million of
GBS to Malawi linked to a high-level corruption scandal in
November 2013 being the most recent example at the time of
writing (Daily Telegraph, November 18, 2013). These c.31
instances represent the universe of cases under scrutiny in this
section.
Threats to apply PC have also been made on a number of
occasions but not followed through for a variety of reasons
(Crawford, 1997, pp. 75–77; de Renzio et al., 2005, p. 12).
There have also been a number of ‘non-cases’ of PC – where
aid or GBS continued in spite of political transgressions –
though a delineation of such cases ultimately depends on aTable 2. Applications of PC by DFID (1997–2014, pp.19–20) Sources: de Renzi
678), Mokor
Year Country PC applied to Stated reason (s) for a
2000 Tanzania (Zanzibar) Security/democratizat
2001 Kenya Corruption
2001 Malawi Corruption and execu
2001 Tanzania Corruption
2002 Uganda Security/defense spend
2004 Malawi Corruption
2004 Rwanda Security/military invo
2005 Ethiopia Security/democratizat
2005 Uganda Democratization
2006 Uganda Democratization
2008 Tanzania Corruption
2009 Zambia Corruption
2010 Uganda Corruption
2011 Uganda Corruption
2011 Malawi Democratization/polit
2012 Uganda Corruption
2012 Rwanda Security/alleged suppo
2013 Uganda Corruption
2013 Malawi Corruption
Table 1. Applications of PC by ODA (1987–1997, pp. 16–17) Sources:
Crawford (1997, 2000), de Renzio et al. (2005), Mokoro (2005), Stokke
(1995), UK Parliament (1992)
Year Country PC
applied to
Stated reason(s) for application
(where stated)
1987 Fiji Democratization/military coup
1988 Burma Democratization/human rights abuses
1991 Kenya Democratization
1991 Sudan Military coup/democratization
1991 Somalia Security/civil war
1992 Malawi Democratization
1992 Sierra Leone Democratization/military coup
1992 Peru Democratization
1993 Nigeria Democratization/military coup
1994 Gambia Democratization/military coup
1995 Kenya Corruption/governance
1996 Zambia Political liberties/democratization/‘good
governance’somewhat normative judgment on what ODA or DFID
‘should’ have done, particularly as some of those cases identi-
ﬁed by scholars were the subject of debate within DFID/ODA
while others were not (Brown, 2005; de Renzio et al., 2005).
Though exploring these instances of ‘non-PC’ would provide
a valuable insight into the political economy of PC decision-
making this article is ultimately concerned with understanding
the thinking behind decisions when they have been taken as
opposed to when they have not. There is also already a rich
literature which engages with the issue of PC non-cases
(Brown, 2005; Crawford, 1997, 2000; Cumming, 2001;
Fisher, 2014; Porteous, 2005).
It is not possible to be wholly certain that these 31 cases
identiﬁed below represent the entire universe of cases –
although they include all examples cited in existing secondary
literature (including systematic comparisons produced in 1997
and 2005), in media sources and ODA/DFID statements con-
sulted and in interviews undertaken for this article. This lack
of certainty is the result of the sometimes secretive or arbitrary
manner in which PC decisions have been communicated – at
one end of the spectrum, formal, public announcements of
aid suspensions have not always been made while at the other
end, some decisions (such as on Uganda in 2006) have been
communicated virtually ‘through the press’ (FCO, 2011). Nei-
ther ODA nor DFID themselves have kept lists or records of
instances of PC being applied before 2005 and DFID claims
that it does not retain comprehensive records of its own
‘non-essential’ activities earlier than the mid-2000s. 12 The
Department’s lack of institutional memory in this regard has
meant that it has sometimes even needed to commission exter-
nal consultants to inform it of its own past practice on PC (see
de Renzio et al., 2005; Mokoro, 2005).
The tables below, which delineate instances of UK aid sus-
pensions, delays, or diversions linked to concerns on democra-
tization, corruption, human rights abuses, and security under
ODA (Table 1) and DFID (Table 2) – and the stated ratio-
nales for these decisions (where available) – since 1987, repre-
sent as complete a list as possible. It should be noted, however,
that while Table 1 captures PC imposed on a range of aid
modalities (albeit mostly programmatic in nature), Table 2
focuses only on PC applied to GBS disbursements – reﬂectingo et al. (2005), DFID Annual Reports (2006–13), Hayman (2011, pp. 675–
o (2005)
pplication (where stated)
ion (police repression of Zanzibari elections)
tive interference in judiciary
ing
lvement in Congo
ion (violent regime response to electoral protests)
ical liberties/ﬁscal indiscipline/expulsion of British High Commissioner
rt for Congolese rebel movement
18 WORLD DEVELOPMENTDFID (and other European GBS donors)’s almost total
restriction of PC decisions to this modality in the contempo-
rary era (Hayman, 2011).
A comparison of the two tables highlights a number of basic
trends. Firstly, while UK PC applied during the 1990s tended
to focus primarily on instances of democratic backsliding or
political space (10 of 12 – 83%), PC in more recent years has
been directed more toward corruption concerns (11 of 19 –
58%). Secondly, while some states have been consistently tar-
geted by UK PC since 1987 – notably Malawi – others have
received greater attention in either the 1990s (e.g., Kenya,
Zambia and Tanzania) or the 2000s (e.g., Uganda and
Rwanda); all, however, have been African since 1992. This is
perhaps not surprising given both ODA and DFID’s very
heavy focus on Africa in their programs.
Furthermore, while there have been some chronological
gaps in the imposition of PC – particularly during 1996–
2000 and during 2006–10 – the instrument’s popularity does
not fall quite as clearly into two separate ‘generations’
(1990s and post-2005) as some commentators, notably Hay-
man, have argued (Hayman, 2011, pp. 678–681). The linking
of GBS to one speciﬁc modality – GBS – does, as Hayman
rightly points out, nevertheless distinguish recent PC imposi-
tions from their predecessors which focused on a range of pro-
grammatic instruments.
Several additional trends are also worth noting at this stage.
Where PC impositions under ODA often involved the whole-
sale suspension of ‘all non-humanitarian aid’ (as, for example,
those during 1991–92) those under DFID have more often
entailed only partial suspensions of GBS portfolios with these
funds being diverted to other modalities still within the coun-
try itself. Moreover, while formal donor coordination archi-
tectures have grown exponentially in most developing states
in recent decades the UK has seldom sought to use these struc-
tures to coordinate PC impositions with other aid partners.
This stands in contrast to UK approaches in the early 1990s
especially where donor Consultative Group fora became the
de facto setting for announcing UK PC decisions in tandem
with other donors. 13
It is crucial, however, to interrogate and unpack these – and
other – trends identiﬁed in greater depth in order to better
understand the UK’s evolving employment of PC. The follow-
ing section will therefore analyze how far instrumental and
expressive rationales have lain behind PC decisions by London
across these 31 instances.
(c) Changes in UK PC policy rationales since the Cold War:
from instrumental to expressive
The UK’s use of PC has always been motivated in part by
expressive objectives – particularly a desire to be seen to be
‘acting’ in the face of high-proﬁle governance abuses by aid
recipient governments. For while some applications of the
instrument – such as Kenya 1991, Malawi 1992, Ethiopia
2005, or Uganda 2006 – have been linked to longer term con-
cerns among donors over democratic backsliding they were
nonetheless triggered by immediate, controversial actions by
the regimes in question: the arrest and harassment of opposi-
tion leaders in Kenya and Malawi, the shooting of protestors
in Ethiopia and the arrest of an opposition leader in Uganda
(Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008, p. 117; Brown, 2007, pp. 307–313;
Cammack, 1998, pp. 183–205; Fisher, 2012, pp.421–422).
ODA and DFID oﬃcials involved in these PC decisions dis-
cuss these events in terms of their being ‘the straw that broke
the camel’s back’, the stepping over of a ‘red line’ by the reci-
pient which made PC necessary and justiﬁable. 14 One DFIDoﬃcial has emphasized the degree to which PC cuts are ulti-
mately based on ‘judgment calls’ at local and HQ level (see
above). 15 It is notable, in this regard, that in DFID’s most
recent staﬀ guidance on conditionality the notion of a ‘breach’
in relations leading to an aid suspension has been replaced by
the much less binary concept of a ‘spectrum’ of options to
allow DFID staﬀ ﬂexibility in diﬀerent circumstances
(DFID, 2014, pp. 3–4).
In almost every case of PC, these ‘trigger’ or – to use Adam
and Gunning’s terminology – ‘show-stopper’ events have sim-
ply been a symptom of a much longer term problem in the
states concerned: Kenya andMalawi had been one-party states
long before the 1990s, Nigeria a military dictatorship before
1993, Uganda and Ethiopia semi-authoritarian states (which,
in Uganda’s case, outlawed opposition parties during 1986–
2005) before 2006, Rwanda a military ‘spoiler’ in Congo before
2004–12 and Uganda a home to major regime-sanctioned high-
level corruption long before 2010 (Adam and Gunning, 2002,
pp. 2052–2054). The PC trigger in each case, therefore, has
rarely been a sudden decline in governance standards (with
the possible exceptions of the PC cases linked to military coups
during 1991–94) but instead a high proﬁle event which shines a
light on longstanding problems in a state. Indeed, almost all of
the instances of PC being applied by the UK since the Cold
War occurred against the backdrop of widespread editorials
and media campaigns in the British press highlighting and pub-
licizing the trigger events concerned. 16
ODA, for example, initially opposed the idea of applying PC
to Kenya with both Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and
Overseas Development Minister Lynda Chalker publicly rul-
ing out an aid suspension linked to poor governance in Kenya
as late as September 1991 (Weekly Review, September 20,
1991). Following the arrest of Kenyan opposition leaders in
November 1991 – an event covered in depth by several major
UK newspapers – the two ministers reversed this position and
both became leading players in persuading other donors to
impose PC upon Kenya (Brown, 2007, p. 310; Weekly
Review, November 22 and December 6, 1991). 17 Moreover,
the decision to suspend GBS to Ethiopia after a 2005 post-
election government crackdown followed a lively debate
within DFID partly prompted, as a senior oﬃcial from the
time has noted, by the high proﬁle of the crisis in the UK
media and NGO community. 18
Other major PC applications have come in the midst of
international media storms including Tanzania 2001 19 (de
Renzio et al., 2005, p. 23), Uganda 2005–06, Malawi 2011
and Rwanda 2012. Indeed the most comprehensive review of
ODA/DFID conditionality undertaken concludes that ‘media
coverage of certain incidents may have had more signiﬁcance
in determining [PC decisions] than Parliament or NGOS’ (de
Renzio et al., 2005, p. 5). Likewise, it argues that ODA and
DFID oﬃcials have tended to take ‘a more narrow view [dur-
ing PC decisions] reﬂecting the need to respond to domestic
pressures’ – noting that the DFID secretary often does the
same (de Renzio et al., 2005, p. 5).
It is also clear, nonetheless, that ODA oﬃcials in the 1990s –
and their political masters – viewed PC as a credible and pow-
erful means to force political reform upon intransigent, semi-
authoritarian regimes. Senior decision-makers involved in the
aid suspensions to Kenya, Sudan, Somalia (all 1991), Malawi
(1992), and Nigeria (1993) have privately stressed their ‘genu-
ine belief’ at the time that PC could ‘bring democracy’ to
Africa. 20 These statements are supported by the public and
private behavior of ODA personnel during this period. PC
was applied with speciﬁc guidance and recommendations as
to how the aid relationship might be restored – usually the
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government (Crawford, 1997; Cumming, 2001).
Internal ODA discussions on the re-establishment of aid
programs in states subjected to PC focused heavily on assess-
ments of whether the regime in question had responded in a
‘positive’ or ‘satisfactory’ manner to the speciﬁc conditions
demanded by London (ODA, 1992). Likewise, the publicizing
of PC decisions to the British media appear to have been fre-
quently opposed in order, as one internal document on
Malawi produced in June 1992 puts it, ‘to encourage as posi-
tive a response as possible [on political reform] from the
Malawi Government’ (ODA, 1992).
Early impositions of PC by the UK, therefore, appear to
have been informed, at least in part, by an ‘instrumental’
understanding of the tool’s eﬃcacy; the belief that it could
indeed be used eﬀectively to promote political reform abroad.
Overall, this appears to have been mainly based on Lindsay’s
logic of compliance and policymakers often expressed clear
guidance on what such reforms should entail. This sentiment
on the instrumental eﬃcacy of PC appears to have been ech-
oed in contemporary scholarly analysis of the phenomenon
which largely focused on reviewing the circumstances under
which PC ‘could be eﬀective’ (Crawford, 1997, 2000;
Levitsky & Way, 2006; Moore & Robinson, 1994; Smith,
1998; Stokke, 1995). Expressive objectives were also clearly
at play in these suspensions although they appear to have been
less central than instrumental ones and focused mainly on
international symbolism – upholding and promoting the norm
of multi-party democracy in the post-Cold War world.
More recent applications of PC by London, however, do not
seem to have been informed by quite the same logic. With
some exceptions, contemporary impositions of PC have rarely
been accompanied by any clear guidance on what reforms the
recipient government in question should make to restore the
aid relationship (de Renzio et al., 2005, pp. 42–44). Indeed,
in some instances, – such as Uganda in 2006 – recipient gov-
ernments have not even been clearly informed that a decision
to suspend aid has been made beforehand (FCO, 2011). Most
impositions of PC since the early 2000s have been declared as a
response to a transgression (such as a corruption scandal) but
not linked to any recommendations on what policy changes
DFID would like to see introduced.
This lack of clarity over the objectives behind more recent
PC applications by DFID has occasionally led to signiﬁcant
confusion withinWhitehall over the rationales for certain deci-
sions. Internal UK government discussions between desk-level
staﬀ and more senior civil servants (both in London and in Lil-
ongwe – and between the two) on suspending GBS to Malawi
during 2011, for example, veered between concerns regarding
‘governance issues’, the closing of political space, human
rights concerns, ﬁnancial mismanagement, risks to DFID’s
own reputation domestically, and the expulsion of UK High
Commissioner Fergus Cochrane Dyet in April (DFID &
FCO, 2011). DFID’s statement announcing the cut in July
referred to concerns over ‘economic mismanagement and gov-
ernance’ (DFID, 2011) but followed an April announcement
by the FCO that London’s relationship with Malawi would
be ‘rapidly reviewed’ in response to Cochrane Dyet’s expulsion
(FCO, 2011). 21 The range of explanations provided for the
cut by British and Malawian newspapers underlines the
unclear reasoning put forward by London for the decision. 22
Signiﬁcantly, however, the Malawi decision – like many oth-
ers in the later 2000s – was formally announced and promoted
by the Department to the British media, following discussion
between DFID and the FCO over what ‘press lines’ to take
on the matter (FCO, 2011). Unlike those few statements madeto explain PC decisions by ODA/FCO in the early 1990s,
however, more recent such statements, including those on
Malawi in 2011 and 2013, have emphasized the extent to
which protecting ‘UK taxpayers’ money’ (DFID Uganda,
2012), ensuring that ‘taxpayers’ money is safe’ (Daily
Telegraph, November 18, 2013) and satisfying the expectations
of ‘British taxpayers’ (DFID Malawi, 2011) have inﬂuenced
the decisions of senior policy-makers. These sentiments have
been echoed by former ministers themselves with one report-
edly framing the 2005 Ethiopia GBS suspension in terms of
his department needing to be able to ‘account to the British
people’. 23
DFID oﬃcials have also followed how their spending deci-
sions have been portrayed in the British media increasingly
closely since the mid-2000s. DFID oﬃcials contacted one
Daily Telegraph journalist in November 2012, for example,
to ask him to amend an article which argued that the UK
should suspend aid to Uganda requesting that he point out
that ‘DFID. . .have already frozen aid to the Ugandan govern-
ment earlier this month’ (Daily Telegraph, November 30,
2012). This emphasis on managing how its PC decisions are
framed in the British media indicates a much higher level of
focus on the domestic expressive nature of the instrument
among UK oﬃcials in recent years.
It is crucial to note, nonetheless, that this change in tone has
been accompanied by a clear loss of faith on the part of most
DFID oﬃcials in PC’s instrumental eﬀectiveness. One DFID
oﬃcial has claimed, for example, that the 2010 and 2011
GBS suspensions to Uganda were not expected ‘to make any
actual diﬀerence to the situation on the ground’. 24 Likewise,
in defending his decision to partly restore GBS to Rwanda
in September 2012 after suspending it in July of the same year
following allegations of support by the Rwandan regime for
Congolese rebels, former DFID Secretary Andrew Mitchell
(in oﬃce 2010–12) told a parliamentary committee that in
his view ‘taking away budget support [from Rwanda] would
have no eﬀect on the [government and its policies] in Kigali’
(BBC News, November 8, 2012).
Indeed, DFID oﬃcials have held quite negative views of
conditionality as an instrument since the early years of the
Department, describing it as the ‘traditional’ way of engaging
with developing states – echoing an early oﬃcial departmental
critique of the ‘old conditionalities’ to be contrasted with a
new approach based around donor–recipient ‘partnership’
(DFID, 1997, pp. 22–49). 25 In its recent literature on condi-
tionality, DFID has reﬂected on past experience and scholarly
analysis in declaring that ‘attempts to “buy” policy reform
from an unwilling partner [through conditionality] have rarely
worked’ (DFID, 2009, p. 19) and that ‘speciﬁc conditions
should not be used to impose speciﬁc policy choices on partner
governments’ (DFID, 2006, p. 10, 2009, p. 19, 2014, pp. 4–5).
Though these are ‘formal’ positions of the department they
nonetheless accurately reﬂect the perspectives of interviewees
consulted during this research.
This revised position on the purpose of PC emerged from a
departmental reassessment of the role, purpose, and
eﬀectiveness of the instrument following Short’s 2003
departure. During 2004–05 DFID strategists in the Depart-
ment’s Policy Unit carried out a comprehensive review of
PC policy. Owing to the Department’s limited institutional
memory, this process was largely placed in the hands of several
consultancy groups who produced several critiques of ODA/
DFID PC current and past practice (de Renzio et al., 2005;
Mokoro, 2005). These analyses ultimately fed-into a 2005 pol-
icy paper – Rethinking Conditionality – which formally laid out
DFID’s approach to PC and the ‘circumstances in which the
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p. 3).
The 2005 paper, while acknowledging PC’s ‘mixed’ record in
successfully promoting a range of reforms, clearly sets out
three circumstances whereby DFID will consider suspending
aid – when countries ‘veer signiﬁcantly away from their agreed
poverty reduction objectives or. . .of a particular aid commit-
ment’; when countries ‘are in signiﬁcant violation of human
rights’ and when ‘there is a signiﬁcant breakdown in the
performance of partner government ﬁnancial manage-
ment. . .leading to. . .corruption’ (DFID, 2005, p. 9). Impor-
tantly, however, the paper stresses that PC decisions ‘will be
based on an assessment of the long-term impact on poverty
of the overall program of the [recipient] government. . .not
on failure to implement any speciﬁc policy’ and that ‘the
UK will seek to talk the issues through with partner govern-
ments before taking a decision’ (DFID, 2005, p. 10). These
sentiments and guidelines have been repeated and expanded-
upon in several other more recent DFID practice papers
where, once again, the three ‘breaches’ of aid relationships
meriting PC are outlined (DFID, 2006, pp. 10–11).
Nearly a decade later, however, many of DFID’s PC targets
appear to have been selected in a far less systematic manner
than these guidelines suggest they should have been (NAO,
2008, p. 5). Instead, the application of PC, as some DFID oﬃ-
cials have acknowledged privately, 26 often reﬂect the promi-
nence of a particular scandal or crisis in the British media
rather than the extent to which a crisis highlights a declining
governance trajectory. GBS was suspended to Malawi in
2011, for example, in part because of London’s concerns over
Lilongwe’s intimidation and suppression of opposition and
civil society organizations (DFID, 2011). Much more oppres-
sive regimes have continued to receive GBS but never have PC
imposed as a result - however, such as that in Rwanda. Kigali
did, nevertheless, see its GBS cut in July 2012 following allega-
tions that it supported rebels in eastern Congo, claims which
received heavy interest from British media houses (Daily
Telegraph, July 27, 2012). Likewise, Uganda has, since the
mid-2000s, been a frequent target of British PC linked to cor-
ruption concerns while Mozambique, another serial oﬀender
in this regard but one which enjoys much less attention in
the UK press, has never been subjected to the instrument (a
discrepancy some DFID oﬃcials have privately acknowl-
edged 27).
Furthermore, PC decisions continue to be made much more
suddenly and unilaterally by DFID oﬃcials than the guide-
lines recommend. Oﬃcials in Uganda in 2006 appear to have
been informed about London’s GBS cuts through reading
local media reports having clearly not been aﬀorded an oppor-
tunity for ‘discussion’ with DFID beforehand (FCO, 2011).
The circumstances in which PC has been imposed by DFID
in recent years, therefore, provides further evidence of the
primarily expressive – rather than instrumental – rationale
that now informs London’s use of the tool.
The last decade has therefore seen an explicit rejection of
compliance-based, instrumental PC among UK oﬃcials. It
has also seen a growing focus by DFID on the domestic
symbolism aspect of applying PC – assuring taxpayers that
their money is not being ‘wasted’ on corrupt governments.
Indeed several recent DFID publications make explicitly clear
that PC can and should play an important role in ensuring
‘accountability to [UK] taxpayers’ in the use of aid funds
(DFID, 2005, p. iii, 2009, p. 20). This simultaneous rejection
of PC as a compliance mechanism and increased use of it
for expressive reasons is paralleled in the statements and activ-
ities of a range of other European donors (see below).4. DRIVERS AND ‘EFFECTIVENESS’ OF EXPRESSIVE
PC
In explaining this shift in thinking on PC, interviewees –
directly or implicitly – consistently highlighted two ‘drivers’
which have informed the process over the last two decades. 28
The ﬁrst of these – the rejection of instrumental PC – appears
to have come about through the fundamental re-focusing of
DFID’s role, purpose, approach to recruitment, and engage-
ment with research and NGOs in the aftermath of its 1997 cre-
ation. This has been a conscious eﬀort directed from the top
aimed, in part, at building a Department whose personnel
reject any presumed eﬃcacy of instrumental PC. On the other
hand, DFID staﬀ have come to embrace expressive PC in
more recent years through a more reactionary set of responses
to perceived reputational risks to the Department – and to
GBS as a modality – among British citizens themselves in
the context of an expanding aid budget during a time of
domestic economic crisis. Interestingly, while the impetus for
this move has also come from ministers’ oﬃces to a consider-
able degree, it has also been driven by CO staﬀ based on the
assumption (in some cases) that this is ‘what ministers want’.
The ﬁnal part of this article will therefore brieﬂy (for reasons
of space) outline these two drivers before concluding with a
broader consideration of whether DFID’s employment of
PC can, in fact, be considered to have ‘succeeded’ in its main
objectives.
(a) The rise of ownership and de-campaigning of the ‘old
conditionalities’ within DFID
UK enthusiasm for instrumental PC impositions clearly
declined during ODA’s ﬁnal years, with more suspensions
occurring during 1991–92 alone than in the subsequent
5 years. Former ODA staﬀ who later became DFID staﬀ,
however, emphasize that while there were some misgivings
within ODA on the instrument’s rather meager returns (nota-
bly in Nigeria and Kenya) 29 a more wholesale rethink on this
issue began only after DFID’s creation in May 1997. In part
this was driven personally by Short, whose tenure at DFID
had profound and enduring consequences for British develop-
ment policy. According to some of her former key advisers,
Short viewed PC as a relic of an era of UK aid policy domi-
nated by geostrategic and economic interests rather than con-
cern for eliminating global poverty. 30 Short’s determination
to instill a wholly pro-poor culture at DFID – in contrast to
its ODA predecessor – lead to a speciﬁc denouncing of ‘the
old conditionalities’ of the past and an ambition to build ‘gen-
uine partnerships’ with recipient governments and societies in
its foundational 1997 White Paper (DFID, 1997, p. 37).
More generally, under Short’s leadership DFID re-focused
its internal structures and recruitment criteria in order to
attract more candidates from NGO backgrounds in particular
(notably through the Social Development Advisers cadre),
most of whom held similarly skeptical views of conditionality.
The vast expansion of DFID’s staﬃng numbers from c.1,080
in 1997 to c.2,600 by 2013 (an increase of 240%) – focused par-
ticularly in the ‘advisers’ cadres – allowed for a much more
rapid installment of a broad constituency of personnel within
the Department of the same mind on this issue than might be
feasible in more established bureaucracies. This process was
complemented and enhanced under the tenure of Hilary Benn
(2003–07) who sought to incorporate a greater awareness of
political economy issues into DFID’s work and oversaw a
major recruitment drive of political scientists and the creation
of a ‘Governance Head of Profession’ cadre in the mid-2000s
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Governance Work for the Poor (Benn, 2006; Robinson,
2013). 31 This process ultimately contributed to the move
toward expressive PC in the Department through the creation
of a body of HQ and CO policy staﬀ focused on the political
economy, and risks, of development interventions (see
below). 32 This cadre also, however, viewed instrumental PC
as fundamentally misguided, informed by a deeper under-
standing of the complex relationship between external inter-
vention and political reform in developing states than their
ODA predecessors.
The undermining of conﬁdence or support for instrumental
PC within DFID should also be seen in the context of the
Department’s enthusiastic investment in, and engagement
with, academic development research (on PC and many other
areas) since 1997 as well as its determination to become a glo-
bal development ‘thought leader’ through closer cooperation
with, and contribution to debates within, the World Bank
and OECD in particular. The building of closer personal
and institutional relationships between DFID staﬀ and indi-
viduals from these communities and institutions since this time
has meant that DFID staﬀ have become particularly familiar
with academic critiques of instrumental PC (Adam et al.,
2004, pp.1059–1060; Killick, 2004, pp. 12–14; Nelson, 1996,
pp. 1551–1554) and supportive of the idea of ‘ownership’ – a
concept which has dominated discussion at High-Level Fora
on Aid Eﬀectiveness in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra
(2008), and Busan (2011). Within these various contexts, con-
ditionality has been rejected as highly damaging and problem-
atic for fostering continued partnership and recipient
ownership of policies and ‘dialogue’ is to be the preferred
method for resolving donor-recipient disagreements on issues
of democratization, corruption, and human rights. This is in
spite of the fact that many of these ‘partnerships’ have in fact
been imbued, at least implicitly, with conditionalities, as a
number of scholars have acknowledged from 1997 onward
(Hayman, 2011, p. 679; Maxwell & Riddell, 1998, pp. 262–
267; Nelson, 1996).
(b) A changing international economic climate and the move to
expressive PC
The embrace of expressive PC by DFID since the mid-2000s
has, however, been driven by more reactionary thinking and
processes – both in ministerial oﬃces and in COs. The 2007–
08 Global Financial Crisis and its consequences have placed
heavy pressure upon most European governments to curtail
public spending where possible and to better justify ‘non-
essential’ expenditure, such as development assistance, to con-
stituents. The impact of this dispensation has been felt partic-
ularly heavily within DFID given the Department’s rising
budget under the Labor government (1997–2010) and protec-
tion against cuts (‘ring-fencing’) under the current Coalition
government. DFID – consequently – became the ﬁrst donor
to build ‘value for money’ considerations into its programs
comprehensively and its approach has been adopted by a
range of other governments since this time. 33
Protecting the Department from accusations that funds are
being ‘wasted’ has become a central preoccupation of DFID’s
bureaucratic culture and DFID oﬃcials interviewed for this
study, more so within COs than UK directorates, privately
bemoaned how acutely conscious they are of the – assumed
– negative consequences that will befall their careers should
they ‘take their eye oﬀ the ball’ on particular aid interventions
and end up being perceived as responsible for continuing sup-
port to an abusive or corrupt regime. 34 Given the diﬃcultiesof tracking GBS expenditure this modality has been a partic-
ular victim of this dynamic and has frequently been cut by the
UK on the basis of these concerns, albeit usually being
diverted to other modalities which by-pass the state
(Hayman, 2011; Maxwell, 2011).
This has led to a culture of growing conservatism and blame
avoidance in the Department (see Hood, 2013) which has even
reached up to the top; Andrew Mitchell waited until the ﬁnal
moments of his time in oﬃce to part-restore GBS to Rwanda
in September 2012 (BBC News, November 8, 2012). The use of
PC has therefore ﬂourished in this environment given its ease
of application (at least in relation to GBS) as well as its high
proﬁle and immediate impact; DFID oﬃcials note that they
feel increasingly incentivized to use PC to demonstrate to their
superiors – and, indirectly, to domestic audiences – that they
are ﬁrmly committed to ‘protecting UK taxpayers’ money’
from abuse. 35
(c) “Does it work?” The eﬃcacy of expressive PC
It is therefore clear that the use of PC by UK oﬃcials since
the Cold War has been increasingly premised upon expressive
as opposed to instrumental rationales. This is a consequence
of a range of inﬂuences and pressures on these individuals
operating at diﬀerent levels over time. To return to the title
of this article, though, whether PC can be considered as ‘work-
ing’ within this new dispensation, however, remains an open
question. In closing, then, it is important to consider whether
or not DFID oﬃcials in the contemporary era believe that
their impositions of PC are delivering success vis-a`-vis their
expressive function.
Few DFID oﬃcials interviewed for this piece, however, were
able to clarify what such ‘success’ might look like or indeed
who the ‘audience’ of PC impositions was speciﬁcally – or
how their reactions to aid cuts might be captured and assessed.
Many CO and ministerial/senior staﬀ linked to PC decisions
since the mid-2000s emphasized the role of PC cuts in address-
ing ‘public’ or ‘taxpayer’ concerns on ‘wasted aid’ in the taking
of these decisions but were unable to break-down this category
of actors further or describe what mechanism might be used to
establish whether, and to what extent, any such cuts had
allayed these concerns among the general populace. What
exactly is being ‘protected’ in PC impositions beyond ‘UK
funds’ was also somewhat unclear with ministerial careers,
DFID’s institutional autonomy, ‘the integrity of GBS as a
modality,’ and the reputation of the development enterprise
itself all being cited by oﬃcials at diﬀerent levels in the UK
and in COs. 36
Furthermore, DFID has signiﬁcantly reduced its investment
in public opinion surveys on aid since 2010 with the most
recent work conducted on this by the Department dating from
September 2011. These surveys examine public opinion on aid
wastage and overall support for aid but shed little light on the
eﬀects of PC cuts on such perceptions (COI/DFID, 2010).
Indeed, a number of UK-based DFID staﬀ interviewed sug-
gested that their perceptions on public support for – or oppo-
sition to – particular aid decisions and approaches are largely
based on careful readings of media reporting, with the Times,
Daily Telegraph, and Daily Mail most frequently cited in this
regard. 37
Several vividly described the impact of such publications’
headlines in determining day-to-day activities in London start-
ing from weekly Monday morning strategy meetings but were
unclear as to whether they believed that such stories were rep-
resentative of public opinion more broadly. Moreover, the fact
that some CO staﬀ have felt it necessary to be more vocal in
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ception that this is ‘what the minister and managers want’
(see above) also suggests that for some in DFID actually pre-
cipitating or the taking of a PC decision is the end goal. These
observations are particularly interesting when considered
alongside the ﬁndings of Adam and Gunning – published in
this journal – on the use of performance indicators in the allo-
cation of aid. These scholars argue that while performance
indicators played an important role in shaping donor-recipient
discussions in Uganda by the early 2000s few were actually
designed to measure policy outcomes speciﬁcally, remaining
‘vague’ and concerned primarily ‘with input and process’
(Adam & Gunning, 2002, p. 2052–2054).
This is not to suggest that the rise of expressive conditional-
ity at DFID is a product of cynical careerism in the Depart-
ment – civil servants are obliged to respond to the demands
(perceived or directly communicated) of their political masters
in a democratic system. Likewise, DFID staﬀ have consistently
– and to date successfully – sought to ensure that PC imposi-
tions result in a diversion of funds to alternative modalities
within the same country rather than a withdrawal of aid itself,
in line with their genuine commitment to providing assistance
to the world’s poorest. Nor can DFID be accused of being
secretive in setting-out its position on PC and in communicat-
ing decisions on the same (at least within the UK) since the
mid-2000s – in stark contrast to many other donors employing
the instrument or to DFID’s ODA predecessor.
What DFID has not yet successfully communicated – to UK
citizens or to those in the countries it provides aid to – how-
ever, is the extent to which PC and other decisions are a
trade-oﬀ between short-term political and reputational posi-
tioning and longer-term developmental programing. DFID’s
March 2014 guidance note on conditionality hints at these
ambiguities more clearly than any previous publication and
intimates, perhaps, at a greater recognition within DFID’s
management class that PC is a question, ultimately, of staﬀ
‘judgment’ than of implementing an applied formula. To some
extent, this resonates with Adam and Gunning’s discussion on
the value of ‘vagueness’ for donors in providing space to ‘not
have to follow through on ex ante threats’ (Adam & Gunning,
2002, p. 2052). If expressive PC is ultimately, however, to be
assessed as eﬀective or otherwise then these complexities and
uncertainties must not only be tacitly and privately acknowl-
edged by DFID but also defended, both in the UK and in reci-
pient states.5. CONCLUSIONS AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This article makes an important contribution to the litera-
ture on PC by turning around the oft-asked question ‘does
PC work?’ to investigate whether aid oﬃcials themselves
believe it can work and, if not, why they continue to use it.
Drawing on concepts discussed in the literature on economic
sanctions, two broad sets of motivations have been delineated
as a framework for understanding applications of PC: instru-
mental (focused on compliance and deterrence) and expressive
(focused on domestic and international symbolism). The arti-
cle has focused in depth on the UK’s imposition of PC sincethe Cold War and argues that while expressive rationales have
always informed the UK’s use of PC, they are far more central
now than they were a decade ago and are largely concerned
with domestic rather than international perceptions. Conﬁ-
dence in instrumental PC among UK oﬃcials, it is suggested,
was fatally undermined by the later 1990s through a ministe-
rial-lead re-balancing of the country’s approach to develop-
ment and through the rapid recruitment of new staﬀ
skeptical of the tool. The move toward expressive PC, how-
ever, has been driven by more reactionary concerns among
ministerial and CO staﬀ relating to the protection of reputa-
tions – of DFID, GBS, and the development enterprise itself
– in the context of domestic economic austerity and rising
aid spending.
The ﬁndings of this study raise a number of questions for
development scholars, as well as for donor oﬃcials themselves.
Most critically, how should the eﬀectiveness of PC be assessed
and measured to take into account its expressive purposes? If
PC’s instrumental eﬃcacy is no longer a major factor in its
employment then clearly analyses which focus only on this
dimension (such as whether PC results, for example, in greater
democratization) require reconsideration. Moreover, if donor
usage of the instrument is increasingly premised on managing
the perceptions of domestic audiences then should donors
themselves look more closely at how PC impositions are inter-
preted by Western citizens and how, if at all, this eﬀects gen-
eral opinions on the value and integrity of the development
enterprise? It is clear, as argued in the ﬁnal part of this study,
that these are not questions currently being explored in any
depth within DFID itself.
Though this article has focused on the UK case, similar
trends can be discerned elsewhere in the European aid net-
work. Following a re-evaluation of its GBS programs in
2011, for example, the European Commission argued that
the modality should be suspended in instances where ‘the
EU’s. . .reputation needs to be protected’ (European
Commission, 2011, p. 4). EU oﬃcials have also increasingly
framed their objections to recipient government actions in
terms of the negative impact such behavior will have on Euro-
pean perceptions of the Commission’s development policies
(Daily Monitor, December 4, 2012). German development oﬃ-
cials have also privately characterized European aid cuts
linked to anti-homosexuality laws and policies in Africa as
based at least partly on a donor desire to ‘communicate with
domestic constituencies’. 38 Similar sentiments have been
expressed to the author by representatives of a range of Scan-
dinavian donors during discussions in Uganda (during 2009–
12) and the OECD (2013).
This is not to say, of course, that this is enough evidence to
support a clear generalization of the ﬁndings of this study
beyond the UK. To do so a far more systematic analysis
would be required - one which considered the recent bureau-
cratic and architectural histories of other aid donors as well
as the salience of aid policy and crises in diﬀerent national
media’s and political cultures. It is apparent, nonetheless, that
the UK is not alone in using PC for expressive purposes and
thus the questions raised in this article have resonance outside
this single case.NOTES1. DFID as a ‘trailblazer’ and ‘innovator’ in the global development
community has been a major theme in the public and private discourse of
departmental oﬃcials since the late 1990s (see Vereker, 2002); then DFIDSecretary, Andrew Mitchell, even described the UK as a ‘development
superpower’, claiming it was ‘in the lead’ in this ﬁeld in June 2011 (BBC
News, June 12, 2011). This has also, however, been a common sentiment
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and in interviews conducted on a range of themes (security, justice,
political economy analysis, governance, etc) in several European, African
and North American capitals during 2009–13 including the World Bank,
Swedish International Development Agency, Dutch Ministry of
Cooperation, Norwegian Agency for International Development,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and US
Agency for International Development. DFID is also the leading funder of
research among bilateral donors.
2. Between 500–600 ODA/DFID staﬀ have been based in East Kilbride,
South Lanarkshire, since 1981. These personnel were primarily adminis-
trative until 1998 when a range of policy positions and departments
(including Finance, Performance and Impact – where conditionality policy
is, at the time of writing, housed) were transferred there from London. A
range of senior DFID staﬀ (directors and directors-general) now also
divide their time between the two oﬃces.
3. Aid suspensions or reductions linked purely to delays in meeting
public ﬁnancial management targets or ﬁscal indiscipline not immediately
linked to corruption – such as those imposed by DFID on Ghana in 2006
or Malawi in 2008 – will not, however, be considered.
4. Interviews with former ODA and DFID staﬀ (September–October,
2009).
5. The 2002 International Development Act states that all DFID
spending commitments should be based solely on their ability ‘to
contribute to a reduction in poverty’ (International Development Act
2002, text available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/con-
tents; accessed 01/02/14).
6. Interviews with former ODA and DFID staﬀ and former FCO oﬃcials
(May, September–October 2009).
7. Interviews with current and former DFID staﬀ (March 2009).
8. Interviews with current and former DFID and FCO staﬀ (March,
May–June, September–October, 2009, May–July, 2012, September–
November, 2013).
9. de Renzio et al. (2005, p. 30).
10. Interviews with current DFID staﬀ (September, 2013; September,
2014).
11. This section is based on interviews with a range of current and
former DFID staﬀ based in the UK and COs during 2012–14 as well as on
FOI material released to the author by the FCO and DFID (see
References).
12. Communication with DFID oﬃcial (by email, July 2012).
13. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this
additional distinction.
14. Interviews with former senior FCO, ODA and DFID staﬀ and
current DFID staﬀ (March, 2007; March–November, 2009; June–July,
2012; September, 2014).
15. Interview with DFID oﬃcial (September, 2014).
16. A brief selection of such coverage includes Guardian, 2011; Daily
Mail, July 10, 2011; Daily Mail, July 27, 2011; Daily Telegraph, July 21,
2012, Guardian, 2012 and Daily Telegraph, November 24, 2012.17. Interviews with former senior FCO and ODA staﬀ (March, 2007;
September–October, 2009).
18. Interview with former senior DFID oﬃcial (September, 2014).
19. Interview with Clare Short, UK Secretary of State for International
Development (1997–2003; November, 2008).
20. Interviews with former senior FCO and ODA staﬀ (March, 2007;
March, September–October, and December, 2009).
21. Interviews with DFID staﬀ (October, 2013).
22. BBC News, for example, explained the cut primarily as a response to
the expulsion of the British high commissioner (‘a diplomatic spat’; BBC
News, July 14, 2011) while the Times viewed it as mainly prompted by
concerns on Malawi’s ‘economic management and governance’ and the
president’s purchasing of a £8 m presidential jet (Times, July 15, 2011). An
article in the Daily Mail several months later even suggested that the cut
had been premised on British opposition to the sentencing of two
homosexual men to ‘14 years hard labor’ in Malawi in May 2010 (Daily
Mail, October 10, 2011).
23. Interview with former senior DFID oﬃcial (September, 2014).
24. Interview with DFID staﬀ (July, 2012).
25. Interviews with DFID staﬀ (June–July, 2012; September, 2014).
26. Interviews with DFID staﬀ (December, 2009; June–July, 2012;
September–October, 2013).
27. Interview with DFID oﬃcial (September, 2014).
28. This section is based on interviews undertaken during 2009–14 with a
range of current and former ODA and DFID staﬀ based in the UK and
COs.
29. Interviews with former ODA staﬀ (October–December, 2009).
30. DFID (2005, p. iii, 2009, p. 20); Interview with Clare Short
(November, 2008).
31. Interview with DFID oﬃcial (September, 2009).
32. Robinson, 2013; Interviews with current and former DFID oﬃcials
(November, 2009).
33. DFID has had a value for money approach since the early 2000s
although the more comprehensive ‘3E framework’ was introduced during
2009–10 (Barnett, Barr, Christie, Duﬀ, & Hext, 2010, pp. 6–10).
34. Interviews with DFID staﬀ (June–July, 2012, October, 2013).
35. Interviews with DFID staﬀ (June–July, 2012, September–October,
2013).
36. Interviews with current and former DFID staﬀ (June–July, 2012,
September–October, 2013, September, 2014).
37. Interviews with DFID staﬀ (September–October, 2013).
38. ‘Oﬀ the record’ comments by German development oﬃcial (March,
2013).
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